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Abstract 
 
Entrepreneurial action is increasingly associated 
with innovation ecosystems because no firm alone can 
render the complex and interdependent services 
demanded in markets. Moreover, entrepreneurial firms 
are increasingly instigators of innovation ecosystems, 
rather than merely participants. However, particularly 
in the pursuit of radical innovation, a question arises 
as to how an entrepreneurial firm begins to form and 
shape the landscape for an emergent ecosystem. In this 
paper, we examine the innovation activities of Formula 
E, a new venture at the hub of an emerging ecosystem, 
aiming to transform motorsports for digital-native 
fans. Digital technologies are providing nearly 
boundless possibilities but represent uncertain 
opportunities in terms of their ability to engage young 
fans, who previously have shown little interest in 
motorsports. We identify probing as a way to use 
initiatives to provoke engagement and generate open-
ended dialog and discussion. Entrepreneurial probing 
helps to expand the innovation landscape in search of 
heterogeneous need-solution pairs. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Digitization has rendered entrepreneurial action 
complex and collaborative [1]. Entrepreneurial action 
refers to organizing and operating activities of a 
business venture as it takes risks in discovering, 
evaluating, and exploiting opportunities [2]. No 
entrepreneurial firm can control all the resources and 
their integration, particularly when innovation is 
targeted at digital services and experiences [3]. 
Innovation requires both dynamic relationships with 
diverse partners across industry boundaries and 
knowledge collaboration in user communities [4]. 
Consequently, entrepreneurial action is less confined to 
the cognitive and emotional capacities of a single 
entrepreneur, an intact team of entrepreneurs, or even a 
stable set of alliance relationships. To organize 
entrepreneurial action in digital service ecosystems, 
collaboration needs to transcend producer–consumer 
divides [3]. In digital service innovation, users become 
critical business partners as co-creators of these 
experiences. 
Ecosystems are constellations that bring together 
diverse partners across different industries to “co-
evolve capabilities around a new innovation: They 
work cooperatively and competitively to support new 
products, satisfy customer needs, and eventually 
incorporate the next round of innovations” [5, p. 76]. 
Innovation ecosystems are recognized as an important 
context for entrepreneurial action that seeks to leverage 
digital technologies [6], [7]. However, the prevailing 
focus in the literature has been on entrepreneurial firms 
as participants and complementors and not as anchors 
instigating, leading, and orchestrating ecosystems [8]–
[10]. 
How does an entrepreneurial firm grow an 
ecosystem for radical innovation? Radical innovation 
implies radical departures from existing practices, 
business models, market categories, or customer 
groups. To pursue such radical opportunities in an 
ecosystem requires an entrepreneurial firm to take 
significant risks and venture into landscapes where 
“you don’t know what you don’t know.” The 
entrepreneurial firm has to constantly play, poke, and 
shape the contours (limits) of the landscape to attract 
new partners and user communities. 
Von Hippel and von Krogh [11] argue that in 
highly uncertain environments, informal and broad 
parallel external searches of need–solution pairs can be 
more cost effective than the traditional practice of 
engaging first in problem formulation in advance of 
“solving” the problem. But the broad search assumes a 
rich landscape with lots of different locations for 
opportunities. The entrepreneurial literature 
acknowledges that opportunities are endogenously 
created by the enactment of entrepreneurs [12]. 
Entrepreneurial action can target social trends and 
changes in user profiles and behaviors [1]. The 
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equifinality of digital technologies also suggests that a 
range of technologies can be competing to meet the 
user or customer need [13]. All this speaks to the 
potential for an entrepreneurial firm to cultivate a rich 
landscape for an ecosystem where a heterogeneous set 
of opportunities can be present. 
We examined the early-stage entrepreneurial 
ecosystem of a new venture, Formula E (FE), in the 
sports entertainment industry. The ecosystem 
comprised of diverse partner firms, along with fluid 
and diverse user communities. The venture sought to 
become the hub of an ecosystem that would disrupt the 
motorsports world by leveraging digital technology, 
transforming how the sport is experienced, played, and 
defined. FE was targeting the next generation of fans, 
millennials, who had previously shown little interest in 
motorsports. While an abundance of digital 
technologies was unceasingly emerging, which digital 
technologies would be appropriate in this digital 
transformation was uncertain. 
FE, in close collaboration with ecosystem partners, 
launched a diverse array of digital experiences and 
applications enabled by mobile, social, virtual reality, 
gaming, crowdsourcing, and connected and 
autonomous car technologies. With these initiatives, 
which were co-created with fans and business partners, 
the venture began to poke and shape the limits of the 
innovation landscape: (1) how sports fans would want 
to engage in digital experiences; (2) how sports would 
be played/performed; and (3) how new sport 
competitions and categories could be invented. The 
initiatives became hotspots for the meaning-making of 
innovative possibilities, but also generated tensions and 
different perspectives among different actors in the 
ecosystem. In the process, both the uncertainties and 
the landscape of opportunities for the ecosystem 
increased. 
Our contribution is positioned as complementing 
existing literature on ecosystems, radical innovation, 
and entrepreneurial opportunity creation. We examine 
radical initiatives of an entrepreneurial firm with 
limited resources and discover the notion of probing as 
a way to expand the landscape for its ecosystem. 
Probing is both deliberate and emergent: it is deliberate 
in terms of provocation; it is emergent in terms of 
engaging in continuous discussions. 
Similar to what is written about cultural probes in 
the human-computer interaction literature, the 
initiatives at FE probed surprises and challenged 
“thoughts and assumptions about people and situations 
being designed for” [14, p. 57]. While cultural probes 
focus on demand-side reactions [14], the initiatives we 
analyzed were poking on both the demand and supply 
side under high levels of uncertainty in search of need-
solution pairs [11]. We introduce the term 
“entrepreneurial probing” because it is used to expand 
the landscape for innovation opportunities. New 
opportunities attract new business partners and user 
communities to join and form new configurations in 
co-creating experiences. 
Next, we review concepts of ecosystems, radical 
innovation, and entrepreneurial opportunity creation. 
We then report on our empirical study. We conclude 
the paper with a discussion of probing as a way to 
grow and shape the innovation landscape for the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
 
We briefly review literature on ecosystems, radical 
innovation, and entrepreneurial opportunity creation. 
 
2.1. Ecosystems 
 
Building on Moore [5], Nambisan and Baron [6] 
defined an innovation ecosystem as a “loosely 
interconnected network of companies and other entities 
that coevolve capabilities around a shared set of 
technologies, knowledge, or skills, and work 
cooperatively and competitively to develop new 
products and services” (p. 1071). Ecosystems are not 
necessarily tied to a coherent and bounded architecture 
comprising interoperable technologies. Instead, 
ecosystems consist of a hub firm, partners, user 
communities, and other stakeholders that offer 
complementary innovations across different and even 
competing platforms. In ecosystems, the partnering 
firms have their own logics and innovation trajectories. 
The various actors gain innovation leverage that comes 
from learning about each other’s activities and from 
sharing resources, including mindshare in terms of a 
common purpose [8]. Innovation ecosystems facilitate 
the creation of new industries and radical goods and 
services, and they potentially reduce the cost and 
increase the profitability of innovation [8], [9]. 
Research on ecosystems has predominantly focused 
on large and incumbent organizations as orchestrators 
or hub firms. The focus has been on leadership, control 
of critical resources, and value appropriation within a 
technology-based hub firm that has market power [8]. 
Adner [15] emphasized the need for tight control to 
manage interdependence and integration risks. 
Ecosystems can spawn much entrepreneurial activity 
by lowering the costs and risks, because the central 
player provides incentives to its partners to “co-evolve, 
align their goals and activities, and further bond 
themselves to one another” [16, p. 220]. The literature 
limits the role of entrepreneurial firms as partners, or 
complementors, in ecosystems [8]–[10], rather than as 
anchors instigating, leading, and orchestrating 
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ecosystems. New ventures are encouraged to connect 
to ecosystems but not to create the ecosystems 
themselves [6]. 
Hence, the emergence of entrepreneurial 
ecosystems might be argued by some researchers to be 
conceptually and theoretically anomalous. First, 
ecosystems are seen as networks that are “the product 
of a long and evolutionary process that defines 
relationships among industry players” [16, p. 219]. The 
entrepreneurial firm’s need for a short-term focus for 
survival runs counter to this long and evolutionary 
perspective of an ecosystem. Second, building an 
ecosystem requires flexibility and adaptability, but new 
ventures are known to be prone to rigidity and 
overconfidence [16]. Third, to avoid a well-established 
and resourced incumbent from entering and crowding 
out the innovation space, the venture needs to target 
risky and bold emergent innovation areas that are too 
far from the interests and capabilities of incumbents. 
Zahra and Nambisan [16] argued that for an 
entrepreneurial firm in an ecosystem pursuing radical 
opportunities is a must, even in the absence of market 
potential. 
 
2.2. Radical Innovation 
 
Recently, Lyytinen Yoo, and Boland [17] proposed 
a new organizing form for radical digital innovation, 
created by the distributed, fluid, editable, and 
configurable nature of digital technologies. The new 
form is an anarchic innovation network. Such networks 
consist of “a heterogeneous pool of actors and tools… 
[but] in the absence of hierarchical control and 
presence of high levels of knowledge heterogeneity” 
[17, p. 59]. In an anarchic network, control is 
distributed throughout the network as each autonomous 
entity (e.g., firm, community, partnership) pursues 
innovations that make sense for its innovation 
trajectories. A plethora of different innovations is 
produced—so-called wakes [18]. Each wake comprises 
its own technologies, practices, structures, and 
strategies. As these wakes interact, much disruption 
and overlap occur, but in addition, trading zones 
emerge where intercalating innovations give rise to the 
next set of wakes. The trading zones promote 
“negotiations, collaboration, and learning through 
mutual perspective making and taking” [18, p. 635]. 
Similar to wakes, Majchrzak et al. argued that a 
“quantum leap in insight” [19, p. 14] can occur when 
participants in the innovation process maintain their 
own distinctive work processes, but structures and 
processes are also put in place that “facilitate the 
confluence of participatory ‘spurts’ of innovation.” 
One key aspect of anarchic networks described by 
Lyytinen et al [17] is that they are not designed ex ante 
because the knowledge resources needed for 
innovation are not known a priori. Rather, anarchic 
networks emerge through interactions among various 
heterogeneous partnerships and collaboration 
opportunities. But neither Lyytinen et al. [17] nor 
Majchrzak et al. [19] address the challenges of an 
entrepreneurial firm in emerging a radical innovation 
network. How to formulate a rich landscape of 
opportunities so that a search for heterogeneous need-
solution pairs can take place? 
 
2.3. Entrepreneurial Opportunities 
 
Entrepreneurship is defined as “the pursuit of 
opportunity beyond the resources you currently 
control” [20, p. 1], and opportunity is a “future 
situation which is deemed desirable and feasible” [21, 
p. 23]. While traditionally it was assumed that “there is 
no entrepreneurial opportunity without customer 
demand” [22, p. 1494], now such demand is so 
fragmented, fluid, and rapidly changing, that 
opportunities are created by entrepreneurs embedding 
themselves in real-time customer “conversations” [23]. 
But such conversations assume that there is some 
certainty in terms of relevant user communities. In the 
early stage ecosystem aiming for markets and service 
categories that do not yet exist, there is high 
uncertainty about customers and technologies for 
interaction and engagement. There are also 
uncertainties regarding potential business partners and 
how to mobilize their resources and enact opportunities 
for innovation wakes that would then bring about 
additional business partners to the network to 
experiment, play, and engage in other forms of 
exploration [18]. 
Some form of probing might provoke diverse 
reactions and encourage interactions and experiences 
that transcend current limits of the innovation 
landscape in an entrepreneurial ecosystem. In human 
interaction design, the concept of probing is deployed 
to open hidden and invisible territories and embrace 
uncertainty and poetic possibilities. Probing (or probes) 
is an engagement strategy that involves provocation, 
ambiguity, absurdity, opacity, inspiration, and pleasure 
[24], [25]. Probes involve a provocative act or artifact 
that is novel and rich. Probes deliberately challenge 
taken-for-granted assumptions, norms, and rational 
thought. The provocations instigate inspirational and 
emotional responses, creating a dialogue and a 
common language with users that result in “a kind of 
intimate distance that can be a fruitful standpoint for 
new design ideas” [26, p. 55]. Such inspirational data 
from probing is not expected to be analyzed but rather 
stimulate possibilities. While the provocation is 
intentional, the inspirational responses are 
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indeterminant. As McDougall and Fels [14, p. 57] 
wrote “Probes are instruments that are metaphorically 
based on the concept of sending probes into the 
complete unknown of outerspace and then waiting for 
data that may or may not come back to try to make 
sense of it without assuming what it might be or where 
it comes from.” Probing does not assume that the target 
user group is known and it does not test any 
hypotheses. Hence, it is different from many prevailing 
methods such as the minimum viable product [27]. 
The earliest form of probing was cultural probing. 
This is a discovery process to be used when users 
might not know their own needs or desires, and 
through which designers might pose their own 
expectancies and users are faced with novel, 
aesthetically rich artifacts [25], [28]. Gaver et al. [25] 
were adamant that probes are not analyzed as rational 
processes to filter out the subjectivity in the responses 
on which the probe is seeking to shed insight. Probing 
is a rather broad concept with many different variations 
[2], [24]. As probing relies on eccentric observations, it 
has remained elusive and poorly understood, outside 
the design fields. 
To summarize, while the reviewed literature 
provides insight into ecosystems, radical innovation, 
and pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunities, we note a 
lack of knowledge about what might happen at the 
intersection of these areas. The literature on 
ecosystems has considered early ventures to be 
participants—not hubs of ecosystems. While the 
research on radical innovation adds to the knowledge 
on how different firms in anarchic networks 
autonomously pursue their digital innovation 
trajectories, it offers little elaboration on how an 
entrepreneurial firm entices these autonomous firms to 
join the ecosystem in the face of high uncertainty. The 
literature on entrepreneurial opportunity formation has 
focused on the articulation of market and customer 
aspirations and technology opportunities through social 
information, but less when markets, customers, and 
technologies are all indeterminant. For a newly formed 
entrepreneurial firm, the question follows: How does 
an entrepreneurial firm grow an ecosystem for radical 
innovation? 
In addressing this question, we structure our 
analysis around digital initiatives that may enact as 
open-ended probes. These initiatives involve digital 
technologies that are associated with equifinality [13]: 
The same user need can be addressed via different 
technological means. In other words, because of the 
decoupling of information from technologies (i.e., 
resource liquefaction) [3], digital objects can be 
rendered in nearly an infinite number of ways. For 
example, a sports fan can have a virtual, immersive, 
and personalized experience via mobile video, 360° 
video, augmented reality, or virtual reality. 
Initiatives serving as probes can expand the 
landscape by generating new cognitive and social 
translations [17]. Cognitive dynamics “form a 
generative dance of knowledge identification, sourcing, 
creation, dissemination and validation” [17, p. 56]. 
Social translation involves redefining and negotiating 
the meaning of innovations, identities, and roles 
through interactions, which leads to sense-making and 
sense-giving within a web of relationships. The more 
radical the innovation, “the more dynamic the ebb and 
flow of knowledge and perspectives” [17, p. 56] and 
the more likely are tensions among different actors. 
These tensions can expand the space of the ecosystem 
for new opportunities as different social interactions 
are contextualized and threaded [23]. 
 
3. Method  
 
Our research was inspired by our reading of a 
Financial Times article on Formula E (FE).
1
 FE was 
the first international fully-electric racing series, 
sanctioned by the Fédération Internationale de 
l’Automobile (FIA). The organization behind the new 
championship was Formula E Group, which had 
obtained its 25-year license from the FIA in 2012. 
Although the FIA acted as a governing body in terms 
of safety and fair competition for several motorsports, 
Formula E acted autonomously in pursuing innovations 
and building its ecosystem. 
After observing FE’s activities for a couple of 
months, we learned that it engaged in rampant 
exploration of the innovation space, evidenced by 
having launched a variety of digital initiatives and 
building a remarkable ecosystem in the process. After 
only two years, the ecosystem included established 
firms and tech startups in the automotive, 
entertainment, finance, luxury, and logistics industries, 
as well as vibrant online user communities, such as 
those on Reddit and Facebook. The innovation network 
around FE was ever-expanding, with new (team) 
sponsors or partnerships announced almost on a 
weekly basis, rendering a revelatory case study. 
Because of our “general wonderment” of what the 
venture had accomplished in a short amount of time, 
we felt the need to delve more deeply into FE’s 
ecosystem and activities by conducting a case study. A 
case study approach is appropriate for examining the 
emergence of a new phenomenon, when the context is 
complex and dynamic and the research question is of 
the type, “why” or “how” [29], [30]. 
                                                 
1 Mitchell, Tom, “China’s Formula E electric car circuit plugs into 
desire for clean air,” Financial Times, December 8th 2015. 
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3.1. Case context 
 
For the FIA, FE provided an opportunity to 
promote clean energy and sustainability, issues for 
which FIA’s flagship championship, Formula 1, was 
often criticized. FE had set itself to challenge the 
notions not only of pollution, but also of elitism and 
sexism perceptions in motorsports. After two years of 
developing, testing, and demonstrating the electric 
single-seater, as well as engaging teams, drivers, and 
sponsors, the inaugural season was kicked off in 
Beijing in September 2014. Although some aspects of 
FE were the same as in other racing series (e.g., two 
drivers per team), the championship was unique in 
several ways: The cars were fully electric; races, 
referred to as ePrixs, were held in different city centers 
around the globe instead of on dedicated race tracks, 
which was possible because of the lack of air pollution 
and low noise levels produced; and qualifying and the 
race itself were held on a single day, instead of 
multiple days. 
Moreover, FE aimed to transform prototypical 
industrial-era motorsports for baby boomers into a 
digital-era sports category for millennials, who had 
shown little interest in motorsports so far. Millennials 
represented a highly diverse and disparate group that 
had fickle values and interests. Not only were they 
generationally, culturally, and knowledge-wise distant 
from the conventional notions of motorsports fans, but 
they also showed little interest in driving or owning a 
car. Hence, FE faced significant uncertainty about who 
potential fans for the new sports series could be. Yet, 
positioned as the next-generation motorsports for the 
digitally literate millennials, FE sought to attract 
attention by launching different digital initiatives to 
engage potential fans in transforming how motorsports 
was experienced, performed, and defined. In particular, 
during the first two years of race operations, FE had 
launched various initiatives, leveraging digital 
technology such as social media, gaming, virtual 
reality, and artificial intelligence. 
 
3.2. Data collection and analysis 
 
We collected data on FE, its ecosystem, and its 
digital initiatives from several sources. Gathering 
multiple sources is generally considered to be 
important in case study research because doing so can 
highlight different perspectives, adding to the complete 
picture of the case [30]. We initially gathered publicly 
available data from FE, such as their press releases and 
news and social media channels. We furthermore 
examined FE’s financial statements and annual reports. 
In addition, we collected data from third-party sources, 
such as news websites and fan forums and 
communities (on Reddit and Facebook). In addition, 
we analyzed interviews with key people at FE (e.g., 
CEO Alejandro Agag and CMO Ali Russell) that 
appeared in news journals, in magazines, and on 
websites. Furthermore, we attended the Long Beach, 
CA (US) and London (UK) ePrixs in person, for a first-
hand experience of all of the on- and side-track 
activities. Also, 16 fans were briefly interviewed at 
Long Beach and 10 at London about how they 
experienced the event, what digital channels they used 
during and in-between races, and how they felt about 
the fan engagement initiatives at FE. One of the 
authors served as the administrator of a local Facebook 
FE fan site. Finally, we conducted an interview with 
Tom Halls, Head of Digital at FE, about the various 
digital initiatives and the role of feedback from social 
channels. 
We organized and analyzed this data based on the 
timeline (i.e., origin, planning phase, season 1, season 
2, future plans), as well as based on different structures 
and issues (e.g., key actors, regulation changes, 
partners, fan engagement initiatives, support series, 
sponsors, sustainability). Several distinct themes 
emerged from the analysis: digital entrepreneurship, 
innovation ecosystems, hybridity (blend of physical 
and digital worlds), process virtualization, fan 
entertainment and engagement, and environmental 
issues. As a next step, we developed a descriptive 
teaching case on FE, touching on all of these themes, 
yet focusing primarily on FE’s digital fan engagement 
initiatives on and off the track. 
At the starting point, we had no idea that probing 
would emerge as a practice that helped to explain a 
pattern of behavior across the initiatives. However, as 
we triangulated our observations with the service 
ecosystem and radical innovation literatures, some 
anomalies appeared to surface. To understand what 
was happening at FE, we entered an iterative process 
of data collection, analysis, and literature study. We 
used several structures to arrange the information, such 
as addressing the questions why, how, and for whom is 
FE launching these initiatives, and examining the 
inputs, processes, and outputs of the digital initiatives. 
We performed our analysis without predispositions but 
with an open mind for unexpected themes or patterns, 
allowing an engagement strategy, probing, to emerge. 
 
4. Findings 
 
Because of ample knowledge heterogeneity and the 
autonomy of action by various actors, FE’s ecosystem 
appears to resemble an anarchic network form. The 
case is notable in the sense that we see an innovation 
ecosystem at an early stage, when anarchic forms 
might be particularly common to create radical 
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innovations. The ecosystem is not preplanned but 
rather is evolving, as is the vision of what a next-
generation motor sport could be. In this section, we 
present a number of initiatives FE had launched to 
simultaneously demarcate and expand the innovation 
space in terms of (1) engaging sports fans in digital 
experiences, (2) redefining fan engagement in sports 
performance, and (3) inventing new sports 
competitions and categories. We analyze the social 
interactions these initiatives engendered (on Facebook, 
Twitter, and Reddit) and the sequence of managerial 
decisions at FE that further pushed and poked at the 
limits of the innovation landscape. 
 
4.1. Engaging sports fans in digital experiences 
 
FE was interested in the exploration of digital user 
behavior that would allow for an experience of 
motorsports in a fan-centric, immersive way—
especially for those fans who could not attend the race 
physically. Hence, FE was pioneering 360° videos and 
virtual reality in the sports world, which virtually put 
the fan in the driver seat. FE management commented: 
“99% of the fans cannot attend the race, which is 
conventionally thought of as the best fan experience. 
We believe, however, that remote digitally-enabled 
immersive engagement can go beyond the real-life fan 
experience.” 
In particular, via the mobile app and in partnership 
with 360 Racing, FE enabled fans to choose among 
360° video live streams from onboard four cars, as well 
as from fixed positions, during the race. At the same 
time, FE was developing virtual reality re-creations of 
the races in collaboration with Virtually Live. More 
specifically, computer-generated images of the tracks 
and the cars were combined with live data about car 
position, speed, movement, etc. As a result, fans could 
choose any position around the track, as well as any 
driver’s car, and see what is happening as the race is 
taking place. These experiences were available live, 
but also were offered for download, for deferred 
consumption. Other 360° videos, available on 
YouTube and Facebook, and virtual reality 
experiences, available on the Oculus, HTC Vive, and 
PlayStation Virtual Reality platforms, included a pit 
stop clip, as well as behind-the-scenes footage of the 
paddock and teams’ garages. 
The social interactions that ensued, uncovered how 
differentiated the community was. Some fans were 
enthusiastic about these initiatives, and their reactions 
confirmed FE’s claim that it had potential to go beyond 
the real-life experience, as this fan quote illustrates: 
“It’s cool to wander into garages and areas that are 
usually cordoned off to fans.” Other fans identified 
unexpected uses of the footage, as one fan commented 
after attending the race in person: “When you are 
attending the race, you can easily miss out on some 
pivotal action. With these technologies, [you] can 
replay exciting and controversial moments, from 
whatever angle of your choosing.” However, the 
equifinality of digital technology instigated 
conversations within the fan community, as this quote 
illustrates: “I could see the point of the 360 degree on-
board videos, but having a computer-generated image 
version of the race seems utterly redundant, when you 
can just watch the real thing.” Finally, some saw the 
experience that current technology offered as limited: 
“Motorsports is a highly sensory experience, it’s not 
just about the sights and the noise, it also involves 
smelling and touching the cars. Moreover, this is a 
social event, yet these immersive technologies provide 
primarily private experiences.” 
These interactions provided FE management with 
new openings to further transform and augment the 
digital fan experience. Also, through direct interaction 
with the fan community on Twitter (see Figure 1), FE 
management (Tom Halls, Head of Digital at FE) found 
additional paths for innovation: “Fans are asking for 
access to the drivers’ live audio streams. Obviously, 
this is very sensitive as team strategies are discussed 
there, yet this is the kind of disruption we embrace in 
this championship.” FE sought to expand the digital 
fan experience even further, as management wondered 
whether fans might be able to interact in real-time with 
drivers during the race. 
 
 
Figure 1. FE mobile app feature poll on Twitter 
 
4.2. Redefining fan engagement in sports 
performance 
 
FE was redefining how fans could be engaged in 
the performance aspect of motorsports. Through the 
FanBoost initiative, fans were enabled to affect the 
race outcome in an unprecedented way, directly 
influencing the performance of drivers through a 
4741
crowdsourcing capability called FanBoost. In 
particular, when fans through crowdsourcing supported 
their favorite driver with their vote, the latter could get 
extra power during the race; the three drivers with the 
most votes were awarded the FanBoost. FE 
management commented: “We are merging social 
media and motorsport in unprecedented ways; this is 
truly gamifying the sport!” 
Fans could vote via social media (Twitter, 
Instagram), using specific hashtags. However, fans 
could also cast their vote through less open 
mechanisms, such as FE’s mobile application and 
website. In particular, fans were allowed one vote per 
mechanism per day. Moreover, FE displayed the 
ranking of FanBoost votes, but not the actual voting 
numbers for each driver. 
For this initiative, tensions and divided perspectives 
among fans and drivers clearly emerged. On the one 
hand, FanBoost generated emotional and personal 
interactions between drivers and fans, as revealed in 
this fan quote: “I FanBoosted Bruno Senna on 
Instagram, and he said thank you for voting. I felt 
great because he used it to pass Prost in the race!” 
However, another fan commented: “FanBoost has 
nothing to do with sport, racing, or driving. It is a 
pathetic attempt to make motor racing more like a 
video game to draw in the moronic PS3 generation.” 
Moreover, what was trending among fans and 
drivers was the legitimacy of FanBoost, and the alleged 
use of bots that generate automated messages to 
artificially increase votes. As a result, the drivers had a 
love–hate relationship with FanBoost, as this driver 
quote after Season 2 illustrated: “I like FanBoost, and I 
think it is a really great feature to have in the 
championship. However, the voting system should 
change to just votes via social media, which makes the 
system very easy to monitor. What I like about sport is 
a fair way of competing. Cheating in any way, for 
instance by buying votes for FanBoost, is wrong. 
Formula E is in discussions about how to improve it 
for next season, and they have all the support from the 
drivers as we want to keep it for Season 3 and 
beyond.” (FE had already adapted the mechanisms 
between Seasons 1 and 2, such that the influence of it 
on performance decreased.) 
By listening to social interactions, FE also was able 
to adapt other aspects of the mechanism. In particular, 
the voting window opened 12 days prior to each ePrix, 
at which point teams and drivers started reaching out to 
their fan base because they realized the fan support 
could help them win races. FE management 
commented: “We have to balance the stimulation of 
excitement prior to the race with the risk of 
oversaturation.” Moreover, whereas in Season 1, 
voting ended before the start of the race, in Season 2, 
FE allowed voting six minutes into the race. FE 
commented: “We learned that fans disliked the fact 
that if their favorite driver crashed in the first corner, 
they basically wasted their vote. So by extending voting 
six minutes into the race, we now see that if a crash 
happens, fans shift their vote.” 
Finally, what often happened was that local 
drivers—those coming from countries where the ePrix 
was held—gained momentum and won the FanBoost. 
FE learned that different voting mechanisms were used 
in different regions. As FanBoost became increasingly 
popular among fans, FE engaged Telescope, which 
supports real-time viewer voting for television shows, 
such as American Idol, to help in counting the votes, 
adding to the legitimacy perceptions of FanBoost. 
 
4.3. Inventing new sports competitions and 
categories 
 
FE also pushed the boundaries in terms of defining 
new sports competitions and categories. In fact, with 
the first, fully electric racing series, it had already 
authored a new category of sport. Moreover, FE started 
exploring eSports opportunities midway through 
Season 2, to stimulate the interest of potential fans who 
had never bought or even driven a real car but who 
might be familiar with racing from video games. It set 
up two “RaceOff Exhibition Events,” at which fans 
could qualify for a virtual race with two professional 
FE drivers. After the event, FE gathered feedback from 
fans—for instance, through Twitter (see Figure 2). 
According to FE management: “The events were a big 
hit; based on this success and the positive buzz around 
it, we decided to launch additional initiatives in the 
gaming space.” 
 
 
Figure 2. Gathering feedback on RaceOff 
Events 
 
FE built on this gaming experience in two ways. 
First, the “eRace” was launched—a track-side event to 
fill in the time slot between qualifying and the race. In 
particular, the fan who set the fastest time on the race 
simulators during the day had a chance to compete 
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with professional Formula E drivers during the eRace. 
Also, the events followed the rhythm of the ePrixs, 
resulting in an ebb and flow of interest. The most 
unique aspect of it seemed to be the emotional 
connection made possible by the move from solitary to 
relational participation, as one fan notes: “It’s great 
that I can go from racing in my bedroom to racing 
against a Formula E driver who won last week.” 
Second, FE announced a stage for the best gamers 
worldwide to compete with each other. In particular, 
the “RaceOff Pro Series” involved fastest-lap time 
competitions among gamers before each ePrix. The 
fastest drivers were invited to participate in a virtual 
race the day before the ePrix, and the winners of these 
virtual races were invited to an all-expenses paid trip to 
the grand finale, held in a custom-built eSports arena in 
London where the final ePrix also took place. The 
downside of this initiative, as social interactions 
indicated, was that it required users to have the Xbox 
console, which was only one of the three main video 
game console makers, along with Sony PlayStation and 
Nintendo Wii. The market is equally divided among 
the three, and this exclusiveness was not in line with 
the expectations of the gaming community. In addition, 
gaming is increasingly moving to mobile and virtual 
reality, which might provide an opportunity for FE to 
be a trailblazer in terms of these technologies as well. 
Moreover, through eSports, FE was exploring the 
limitations of simulated racing. Its 2017 plan included 
setting up a virtual-only race among its real drivers, 
and FE management indicated such races might 
provide points for the championship in the future. They 
also have been contemplating a blending of the two 
worlds and having virtual and real-world drivers 
compete in the same race. 
Another sports category in which FE was pushing 
the boundaries is driverless car races. In Season 3, 
kicked off in Fall 2016, FE included plans to launch 
Roborace, as a support series for FE. FE management 
commented: “Others could have announced a 
driverless car championship, but they probably didn’t 
dare to. For Formula E, this kind of bold initiative 
makes sure we explore possible directions for the 
future. In particular, this [move] provides tremendous 
opportunity for excitement as there are no concerns 
about driver safety. Moreover, there could be 
competitions of [hu]man-vs.-machine.” 
In the Roborace series, ten teams would compete, 
each using the same car. For the design of the car (see 
Figure 3), automotive futurist Daniel Simon was 
engaged. Simon, known for his vehicle designs in 
blockbuster movies, such as Tron: Legacy and Captain 
America, commented that “the Roborace is as much 
about competition as it is entertainment. Therefore, 
and quite unusual in today’s racing world, beauty was 
very high on our agenda and we worked hard to merge 
the best performance with stunning styling.” 
 
 
Figure 3. Robocar 
 
Denis Sverdlov, CEO of Roborace, added: 
“Roborace will provide its viewers with a fascinating 
spectacle as the world’s best minds will compete with 
each other to create the fastest and most efficient race 
cars around. Now, the whole racing team will be at the 
center of attention throughout the competition, 
whereas previously attention could only focus on 
drivers.” Three types of teams were to be competing: 
traditional car manufacturers, technology firms (e.g., 
Google and Apple), and crowd-sourced teams. In 
particular, to explore opportunities for engaging fans, 
the public—especially teams of coders from tech 
startups and universities—will be able to submit 
algorithms, which will then race against the other 
teams. 
Also, given the tension associated with car 
crashes—a spectacle for fans, yet potentially creating 
distrust in the technology—Roborace is expected to 
simultaneously explore two formats of Roborace 
competition. Sverdlov explains: “One will be about the 
safety and the other one will be called ‘fight mode,’ 
where the cars can behave quite aggressively. We 
really want to involve our technology partners to work 
out the right balance between safety and the show.” 
The announcement of the new sports category 
already had caused a lot of stir within the community, 
as the quote from this skeptical fan illustrates
2
: “If 
every car is plugging away lap after neatly 
programmed lap, where will the action be? You can’t 
intimidate machinery. You can’t get up in the mirrors 
of a robot and make them sweat by hanging right off 
their bumper until they either move over or screw up.” 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
In this paper, we identified gaps at the intersection of 
the literatures on ecosystems, radical innovation, and 
                                                 
2 http://blackflag.jalopnik.com/who-do-you-root-for-when-no-ones-
driving-an-autonomous-1768409635  
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entrepreneurial opportunity formation. To address the 
literature’s missing perspective in early-stage 
entrepreneurial ecosystems, the research question was: 
“How does an entrepreneurial firm grow an emerging 
ecosystem for radical innovation?” We have analyzed 
this question in the context of a new venture, Formula 
E in the sports and entertainment industry, that is 
reinventing the motorsports world with digital 
technologies. 
Our triangulation of the observed patterns from FE’s 
initiatives and the literature advanced a concept of 
entrepreneurial probing. We define entrepreneurial 
probing to follow the key elements of probing in the 
human interaction design literature. Probing constitutes 
of deliberate provocation and open-ended dialog and 
conversation about need-solution pairs. Entrepreneurial 
probing shares the goal of cultural probes that focus on 
uncovering needs of target groups that the designer is 
unfamiliar with. Entrepreneurial probing also includes 
technological probing that makes users aware of 
emerging technological solutions, trends and 
developments and gathers social information regarding 
their acceptance [2]. As entrepreneurial probing 
addresses need-solution pairs, the core notion of 
opportunity formation is maintained in the engagement 
strategy. 
Just as probes in general, entrepreneurial probes do 
not aim to seek general or average characteristics, to 
validate expectations, or to “solve” a particular 
problem, but rather to discover what previously was 
invisible or hidden. They aim to explore the surprises, 
unexpected uses, and unintended consequences and 
tensions produced from people’s real, lived-with 
experiences. Hence, probes do not narrow the scope of 
innovation or its meaning but rather expand it. 
Entrepreneurial probing aims to overcome taken-
for-granted assumptions and to open up new 
possibilities in an emerging ecosystem. FE challenged 
the notions of how motorsports are experienced, 
performed, and defined. What we observed at FE is 
that, through its initiatives, it did not try to converge 
and validate design requirements or understand or 
proclaim commonalities of possible fan and customer 
communities; rather, it sought to provoke new 
interaction, reflection, and debate and thereby to 
increase uncertainty. In particular, FE discovered huge 
variations in reactions on its initiatives. For instance, 
eSports and Roborace invigorated tensions among fans 
about what the essence of motorsports was, and the 
immersive fan-centric experiences revealed what fans 
were looking for when attending a race. 
Entrepreneurial probing engendered open-ended 
dialog and discussion that linked to social trends and 
diverse user communities, as well as fueled tensions 
among and between communities. Platforms for 
probing at FE included Facebook groups, updates and 
comments, Twitter posts and polls, Web Forum 
interactions, Blog posts, and wikis. Through probing, 
social trends were identified at FE, such as the 
specifics of the FanBoost mechanism and its potential 
manipulation. Probing provided inspirations about 
unfolding developments that lead to entry of new 
actors into the ecosystem. For instance, the 
introduction of Roborace brought established 
universities into the ecosystem. 
Besides the deliberate and emergent elements, we 
assert that entrepreneurial probing addresses both 
needs and solutions at the same time. Entrepreneurial 
probing encourages ambiguity and involves pushing 
boundaries of innovation landscapes so that diverse 
actors can then pursue heterogeneous need-solution 
pairs that fit with their own unique innovation 
trajectories. Entrepreneurial probing can expand a 
landscape for diverse user communities including lead-
users [31]. A case in point is FE’s endeavors in 
eSports, in which it motivates professional gamers to 
compete against real-life racers. 
While probing can be thought of as a form of 
exploratory learning, it lacks some of the aspects often 
associated with exploration [32]–[35]. The literature 
argues for highly selective exploration by a new 
venture with limited resources. Exploration should be 
tightly focused on an identified problem. However, we 
see a broad range of initiatives at FE, many of which 
have little in common. The exploration literature also 
argues that to gain value from exploration, there needs 
to be integration of new knowledge. However, we saw 
little evidence of integration of knowledge across 
initiatives at FE. In addition, probing assumes 
engagement including co-creation that is not 
necessarily present in exploratory learning. Also, 
entrepreneurial probing does not involve 
experimentation, which comprises developing a 
hypothesis and systematic evaluation [36]. Instead, 
entrepreneurial probing is about “feeling around,” or 
poking for interest or attraction in previously 
unfamiliar territories. 
In this paper, we have advanced entrepreneurial 
probing as a concept that we speculate might 
generalize to other early-stage entrepreneurial 
ecosystems. We hope we have identified a potential 
research area, probing at emergent entrepreneurial 
ecosystems, that can trigger subsequent theorizing and 
systematic and rigorous empirical inquiries. 
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